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Lorraine Daston’s recent monograph Against Nature is, according to the book’s back cover, “[a] pithy work of philosophical anthropology [that] asks why we continually seek moral
orders in natural orders…” Originally published in the “De Natura” series, in 2018, with Matthes and Seitz Berlin, the book is
now available as part of the MIT Press’s “Untimely Meditations
Series.”
Though the relationship between morality and nature has
been previously analyzed by various philosophers, Daston
takes a different tack. Unlike G.E. Moore, who famously argued that it’s fallacious to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (Moore
1967), and unlike John Stuart Mill, who argued that nature is
frequently disvaluable (Mill 1874), Daston doesn’t attempt to
criticize the moralization of nature. Nor, for that matter, does
she attempt to defend the claim that nature should be morally
valued. Instead, she seeks to explain why, in spite of compelling objections to the contrary, human beings continue to invest
nature with moral authority. More specifically, Daston thinks
that the explanation has something to do with the sort of beings
we are: something to do with human nature.
Against Nature is comprised of eight chapters in total. Chapters 2, 3, and 4, are about three different, but related, senses
of the word “nature”. The first sense is specific nature. Specific nature is what we have in mind when we claim that it’s in
something’s nature to do, or to be something. In other words,
specific natures are essences: they’re the properties that make
something the kind of thing it is, i.e., the properties that make
a human being a human being, a tree a tree, a squirrel a squirrel, etc. (7). The second sense is local nature. Local natures,
according to Daston, are “the characteristic combinations of
flora and fauna, climate and geology that give a landscape its
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physiognomy: the desert oasis or the tropical rainforest, the
Mediterranean shore or the Swiss Alps” (15). Though local nature is an old concept, local natures were reimagined by 17th
and 18th century theorists as systems, each of which is comprised of interconnected elements that have their own distinct
roles, i.e., local natures were reimagined as ecosystems (18).
The third sense of ‘nature’ refers to universal natural laws: the
sort of laws that scientists posit in their efforts to understand
the phenomena (23).
So why do human beings currently, and throughout history,
imbue nature’s orders with moral authority? Daston’s threefold
answer is provided over the course of Chapters 6 and 7. The
first piece of the puzzle is that normativity (including moral
normativity) has a conceptual connection with order (48-51).
More specifically, norms have a certain amount of consistency and generality built into them, and norms are a basis upon
which people predict each other’s behavior and form expectations of one another. The second piece of the puzzle is that
we use representation to understand things (52-53). Using the
various natural orders, we encounter and perceive, to try to understand morality, is something that comes naturally to us, so
to speak. The third and final piece of the puzzle is that natural
orders are far more numerous and visible than human-made
orders are (55-64).
Since Against Nature is short, readable, and inexpensive, I
think that buying it is well worth the reader’s resources. The
word ‘nature’ has a number of different uses, and Daston’s efforts to distinguish them and yet also show how they’re related,
will be of interest to philosophers working in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, environmental philosophy,
and moral philosophy. As a bonus, the book contains a series
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of illustrative figures, e.g., an image of Schopin’s The Children
of Israel Crossing the Red Sea, and a photo of the Strasbourg
Cathedral’s Astronomical Clock. The book is engaging enough
without these images, but they’re entertaining nonetheless.
Though Daston briefly mentions John Stuart Mill’s critique
of nature (4-5), one problem with her book is that she never explicitly discusses his distinction between the wide and narrow
senses of ‘nature’, i.e., his distinction between an amoral sense
that literally includes all phenomena; and a narrower, moralized sense that specifically refers to that which exists, or occurs, independently of human agency. To be fair, Daston seems
aware that we frequently employ the narrow usage of ‘nature’:
she notes that we use the word to distinguish that which is inborn from that which is cultivated, and that which is wild from
that which is civilized (7). She also observes that while some
cultures distinguish the human from the natural, others don’t
(57-60). Still it would have been useful for her to explicitly discuss Mill’s distinction and how it relates to the three senses of
‘nature’ that she herself distinguishes. Upon inspection, Mill’s
narrow sense of ‘nature’ was sometimes implicit in Daston’s
observations. For example, in Chapter 2, Daston is careful to
note that the categories associated with specific natures are
different from human-made categories. Things with specific
natures (things that belong to natural kinds) reproduce themselves, whereas human artifacts do not (12). Of course, the distinction between natural categories and human-made categories, presupposes Mill’s narrow sense of ‘nature’.
In other places, Mill’s narrow sense challenges Daston’s
claims. For example, in Chapter 8, Daston contends that nature isn’t inherently conservative. Though she’s right to claim
there are many natural orders to choose from, and that some of
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those orders, when moralized, yield reformist or revolutionary
conclusions, rather than conservative ones, e.g., the matriarchal
social structures bees form (68-69), narrow nature does seem
to be inherently conservative. After all, progress requires the
exercise of agency. Social progress requires that we critically
analyze the norms we grew up with and make conscious changes to them. Medical progress requires that we use our agency
to challenge natural states of affairs, e.g., to cure disease and to
prevent death. One particularly important form of progress –
reducing wild animal suffering – will require significant interference with narrow nature. Most individual wild animals die
painfully at a very young age, and those who live to maturity
suffer significant burdens such as disease, parasites, recurring
hunger, and the threat of predators. Significantly improving
their lives will require that we interfere with wild ecosystems
(Johannsen 2021).
Notwithstanding my concerns above, Against Nature is an
engaging book that substantially contributes to our understanding of the relationship between morality and nature. I highly
recommend it.
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